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Abstract: There are individual and cultural differences in how memories of our emotions are 
cognitively represented. This article examines the cognitive representation of emotions in different 
cultures, as a result of emotional (in) consistency in different cultures. Using a continuous semantic 
priming task, we showed in two studies that individuals who were less emotionally consistent across 
relationships have stronger associations of their emotions within those relationships. Further, we 
found (in Study 2) that in a culture characterised by higher levels of emotional inconsistency across 
relationships (Singapore), stronger associations between emotions within relationships were found 
than in a culture characterised by emotional consistency (USA).This cultural difference in cognitive 
representation was fully mediated by individual differences in cross-situational consistency levels. 
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It only happens when I dance with you, that trip to heaven till the dance is through 
With no one else do the heavens seem quite so near. 
Why does it happen here, only with you? 
Two cheeks together can be so divine, but only when those cheeks are yours and mine 
I’ve danced with dozens of others my whole life through 
But the thrill that comes with spring when anything can happen 
That only happens with you 
It Only Happens When I Dance With You (Berlin, 1948) 
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Many love songs have been written about the emotions we experience in the presence of others. No 
doubt we develop associations between different people and different feelings. One person may be 
associated with joyful memories, while another may be associated with annoyance. How we come to 
form associations between different ideas has fascinated many throughout the history of memory 
research (Bower, 2000). Our beliefs and individual traits influence our memories of emotions (Barrett, 
1997; Levine & Safer, 2002). Research on the subjective experience of emotions has identified 
universals as well as culture-specific differences, thus underscoring the importance of examining both 
intercultural and intracultural dimensions of emotion (Kuppens, Ceulemans, Timmermn, Diener, & 
Kim-Prieto, 2006). 
In this paper, we report two studies that examine differences in how people cognitively represent and 
recall their emotions. Our results point to cultural differences in whether emotions are represented as 
embedded in social relations or as part of one’s individual identity. We first identify a common 
individual difference determinant, namely emotional consistency across social contexts, which is the 
degree to which individuals experience similar types and levels of emotions across situations and 
relationships. We expect that cognitive representation of emotions vary with the extent to which an 
individual’s emotions are influenced by the people they are with (emotional flexibility or 
inconsistency) or are relatively independent of social relations (emotional consistency). 
 
Culture and the social nature of emotions 
Emotions are social phenomena that are shaped by the sociocultural context in which they occur 
(Mesquita & Leu, 2007; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). Culture drives how emotions are understood 
(Mesquita & Leu, 2007). While emotions have been described as internal states or personal reactions, 
they can also be viewed as interpersonal exchanges that are inseparable from the larger social context 
(Kitayama & Markus,1994; Markus & Kitayama,1991; Rivera & Grinkis,1986). Indeed, in 
interdependent cultures, emotions have been shown to be more grounded in interpersonal 
relationships, while in independent cultures emotions primarily implicate the self (Mesquita, 2001; 
Uchida, Townsend, Markus, & Bergsieker, 2009). East Asians have a general cognitive inclination to 
pay more attention to context when perceiving objects, people and events (Ji, Peng & Nisbett, 2000; 
Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett, 2003). For example, an experience sampling study by Oishi, 
Diener, Scollon, and Biswas-Diener (2004) found that the influence of the relationship context on an 
individual’s self-report of emotions was larger for individuals from interdependent cultures (Japanese, 
Indians and Hispanics) as compared to Americans. Being with friends increased positive affect across 
samples, but the effect was stronger for Japanese participants. Thus, for interdependent individuals, 
emotions differed depending on whom one was with, while emotions were relatively less affected by 
the social context for independent individuals. 
Culture also has a deep impact on people’s recollections of their emotional memories. Large cultural 
differences have been observed in retrospective reports of emotions that reference longer time frames 
(Scollon, Koh, & Au, 2011). When momentary reports of emotions were compared with retrospective 
reports, two separate studies found cultural differences between European Americans and Asian 
Americans only in their retrospective accounts, but not in their online reports (Oishi, 2002; Wirtz, 
Chui, Diener, & Oishi, 2009). Further, Scollon, Howard, Caldwell, and Ito (2009) showed that beliefs 
about ideal affect correlated less with online emotional reports and more with recalled reports that 
referenced longer time frames. Bringing together the evidence that emotions are more socially 
embedded in interdependent cultures than independent ones, and that emotional memories are 
influenced by culture, we predict that cultures will differ in the cognitive representation of their 
emotional memories. 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals in interdependent cultures are expected to have stronger associations of 
emotional memories within each relationship than individuals in independent cultures.  
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Inter-relationship consistency and the centrality of relationships in emotions 
Another dimension on which individual and cultural differences have been found is the level of 
consistency of self-descriptions when one is with different people (Roberts & Donahue, 1994). 
Individuals from East Asian cultures show greater flexibility across contexts, which is in contrast with 
the Western emphasis on a consistent individual identity. East Asian culture calls for an 
interdependent self-construal with the adjustment of one’s behaviour to fit the demands of the 
situation (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). While Western self-validation theories emphasise the 
importance of an autonomous self (Swann, 1983), the East Asian dialectical self accepts 
contradictions and fluctuations as natural and even necessary to maintain harmony (Peng & Nisbett, 
1999). The traditional Western assertion is that a person who expresses her true self is considered 
authentic and this contributes to positive outcomes, such as higher self-esteem, well-being and more 
meaning in life (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2009). In contrast, 
maturity in East Asia is linked with taking the perspective of others and adjusting to their expectations 
(Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). Self-consistency across situations is therefore less important. 
Suh (2002), for example, found that Koreans had a more flexible view of themselves across five 
different relationship contexts (e.g. how impulsive they were with a parent, close friend, professor, 
stranger or a younger person). In addition, consistency levels for Korean students were less predictive 
of their general levels of subjective well-being and social likability, which suggests that as compared 
to American culture, such consistency was less important or expected in Korean culture. 
English and Chen (2007) found that the self-descriptions of Asian Americans were less consistent 
across contexts within a time period compared to European Americans (e.g. expressiveness with a 
friend versus a parent). However, Asian American demonstrated consistency over time within specific 
relationships. The present studies extend the argument from English and Chen (2007) to emotions as 
well. In order for less consistent individuals to maintain consistency within their relationships, we 
reasoned that it would be important for such individuals to represent their emotional memories around 
specific relationships rather than around the self. 
Two lines of existing research support our propositions. First, culture teaches people what is 
important to remember about their experiences, and over time, this shapes their autobiographical 
memories (Fivush, 2008; Fivush & Nelson, 2004). 
For example, Euro-American mothers used story-telling about emotional experiences to emphasise 
the autonomy and distinctiveness of their child more often than Chinese mothers who gave 
prominence to social interactions and relationships surrounding the child when discussing emotions 
with them (Wang & Fivush, 2005). Second, our proposition is also in line with the “if … then” 
framework outlined by Mischel and Shoda (1995). 
To those for whom the relationship context is an important “if …, then” relationships become a 
central node around which emotional information is organised. People who are less consistent across 
relationships would represent emotional information specific to each relationship separately in their 
cognitive memory networks because emotions need to be retrieved within their social context. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who are less emotionally consistent across relationships are expected to 
have stronger associations of emotional memories within each relationship than individuals who are 
more emotionally consistent. 
Cognitive representation of emotions 
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A cognitive analysis of emotions can yield important insights into both the causes and consequences 
of emotions (Ready, Robinson, & Weinberger, 2006). Studying the cognitive representation of 
emotions helps us to unpack people’s self-reports of past experiences. For example, when asked how 
cheerful one felt over the past year, a person could use either an episodic or semantic strategy. With 
an episodic strategy, the respondent revisits each momentary experience within a time period to 
mentally sum moments and arrive at an overall response. Alternatively, a semantic strategy relies on 
generalised beliefs about the emotional self. 
Robinson and Clore (2002) demonstrated that beyond very short time frames (e.g. past day), 
individuals tend towards a semantic strategy to fill in their memory gaps. Moreover, organised 
structures of semantic knowledge can inform us of an underlying belief system as semantic 
knowledge becomes more tightly structured and associated over time. For example, Robinson and 
Kirkeby (2005) showed that satisfied people have the belief that positive emotions go together. The 
work by Fivush also provides support for this semantic argument, as cultural norms about the nature 
of emotions shape semantic knowledge over time (Wang & Fivush, 2005). By examining the 
cognitive representation of emotions in our studies, we can test if individuals raised in different 
cultures have different semantic beliefs about the centrality of the social context in their 
interpretations and memories of emotional experiences. 
Hypothesis 3A. Individuals in interdependent and independent cultures differ in their emphasis on 
emotional consistency across relationships. We expect individuals in interdependent cultures to be 
less emotionally consistent than individuals in independent cultures.  
Hypothesis 3B. We expect that levels of emotional consistency across relationships mediate the 
impact of culture on the cognitive representation of emotions. 
 
Measuring the cognitive representation of emotions 
Early research that examined the cognitive representation of emotions relied primarily on judgements 
of similarity in the emotion lexicon and used multi-dimensional scaling techniques to analyse the data 
(Romney, Moore, & Rusch, 1997; Russell, 1983; Shaver, Wu, Schwartz, 1992 ). This research was 
seminal in mapping the structure of emotions and revealed key universal features of the emotion 
lexicon. The present studies, however, used a reaction time paradigm to establish an index of the 
tightness of representation of emotions by examining the speed of participants’ reactions to sequential 
trials that matched or mismatched the concept of interest (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006). This 
sequential priming paradigm allows researchers to infer the cognitive structure of the items (Robinson 
& Kirkeby, 2005). While research on emotion lexicon similarities reveals the structure of lay theories 
on similarities among emotions, a reaction time paradigm allows us to infer how individuals actually 
store and use their emotional memories. This cannot be quantified using a lexicon similarity task, as 
people would not have conscious access to this. 
Robinson’s computer-administered task asked participants to rate the extent to which they 
experienced a series of emotions as quickly and accurately as possible (Robinson & Kirkeby, 2005). 
Emotion words were presented one at a time in random order. In half the trials, the valence of the 
emotion being rated was preceded by an emotion that matched it in valence (e.g. annoyed–angry) and 
in the other half, it was preceded by an emotion that did not match (e.g. peaceful–miserable). If 
individuals’ emotions were structured by valence, their responses to new emotion words that matched 
in valence should be faster. This would be due to the speed and reach of spreading activation of 
related concepts based on the semantic associations of these items (Joordens & Becker, 1997; McRae 
& Boisvert, 1998). Thus, faster reaction times would demonstrate that there was a stronger association 
between the concepts along that sorting dimension (Robinson & von Hippel, 2006). Robinson and 
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Kirkeby (2005) found that individuals structure their emotions by valence, as they were indeed 
quicker in responding to sequential questions of matched valence. 
In another study by Ready et al. (2006), participants not only saw the emotion terms to be rated in 
each trial, but they also saw a time frame—“today” or “in general.” Each of the emotion terms was 
crossed with the time frames and then presented randomly. By looking at the response speed of 
participants across trials, Robinson and his colleagues were able to determine the strength of time 
frame as a structuring concept among participants of different age groups. In the present studies, we 
use this task to examine if individuals from different cultures structure their emotions by our 
dimension of interest—that of social relationships. 
 
STUDY 1 
Our first study examined the key mechanism that we are proposing in our framework—that 
individuals who are less emotionally consistent across relationships are expected to have stronger 
associations of emotions within each relationship than individuals who are more emotionally 
consistent (Hypothesis 2). A within-culture study was conducted with a Chinese-Singaporean 
participant group. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from Singapore Management University (SMU) and were screened for 
proficiency in English as a first language. Eighty-eight Chinese-Singaporean students (72 female,  
Mage = 20.51, SD = 1.40) participated for research course credit. 
Materials and procedure 
Participants first completed a short questionnaire in which they described their relationships with two 
close same-gender friends. The questionnaire guided participants to bring two specific individuals to 
mind and to think about their relationships with these two individuals, in order to prepare themselves 
for the subsequent tasks. 
Participants were instructed that the two friends selected should not know each other and participants 
should spend time with each friend separately. Next, participants were asked to complete the 
Relationship-Emotions Task that followed the continuous semantic priming procedure used by 
Robinson and his colleagues (Robinson & Kirkeby, 2005). Participants were presented with 30 
positively valenced emotions terms and 30 negatively valenced emotion terms2, as had been 
previously used for this task (Ready et al., 2006). Participants saw these 60 words presented in 
random order twice for a total of 120 trials. 
The task was described to participants as follows: “In this task, you will be asked to rate several 
emotions as quickly and accurately as possible.” Participants were then introduced to the five-point 
rating scale (1 = none to 5 = extremely). Participants were told to rate “the amount you experience a 
particular emotion with either of the two people over the past year.” 
                                                     
2
 Positively valenced emotion terms used were: Admiration, affection, bold, brave, cheerful, confident, 
delighted, eager, elated, energetic, enthusiastic, excited, glad, gratified, happy, inspired, interested, joyful, lively, 
loving, passionate, peaceful, pleasant, pleased, positive, proud, respect, strong, thrilled, worthy. Negatively 
valenced emotion terms used were: Afraid, agony, angry, annoyed, anxious, ashamed, bitter, blue, dejected, 
depressed, disappointed, distressed, down, fearful, frightened, gloomy, guilty, hostile, irritable, jittery, lonely, 
miserable, moody, nervous, regret, sad, scared, stressed, upset, worried. 
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This Relationship-Emotions Task was administered using the computer program, DirectRT and as 
shown in Figure 1, for each trial, a specific relationship (e.g. name of first friend—John) was 
displayed centred horizontally and approximately 1 inch from the vertical centre of the screen. The 
target emotion (e.g. happy) was displayed about half an inch below the name of the person and the 
response scale was displayed about 1 inch below the vertical centre of the screen. Participants 
indicated their responses by using the five sequential keys on the same row of the keyboard labelled 
with the numbers 1 through 5. To ensure accurate capture of their reaction times, participants were 
asked to place their fingers on the five keys throughout the experiment and to simply press down on 
the appropriate key as they thought of their responses. Participants completed five practice trials, 
within each of the two blocks, before starting on the actual study questions. The order of presentation 
of the friends’ names was randomised between each trial, such that different participants saw different 
orders (e.g. friend1–friend1–friend2 or friend2–friend1–friend2). After the participants had completed 
rating the first block of 120 trials, they were instructed to take a 30 second break before repeating the 
task in a second block. Thus, each participant completed a total 240 trials. 
 
Figure 1. Sample screen from relationships-emotions task. 
Results 
Data transformations and priming scores 
Reaction times for the task were recorded in milliseconds. As reaction time data is highly skewed, the 
data were then log-transformed. Consistent with Robinson and Kirkeby’s (2005) analysis, outliers 
were identified as being plus or minus 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. Outliers constituted 
1.8% of all the reaction time data in Study 1 and were excluded from further analyses. Based on the 
design of the Relationship-Emotions Task, there were four possible relationship pair combinations 
which each occurred approximately 25% of the time: friend 1 prime preceding friend 1 target (F1F1), 
friend 1 prime preceding friend 2 target (F1F2), friend 2 prime preceding friend 1 target (F2F1) and 
friend 2 prime preceding friend 2 target (F2F2). 
Priming scores were calculated to provide an indication of the strength of association of emotions 
within each relationship. To determine the extent to which participants were faster in answering a 
target question about friend 1 when a friend 1 prime question, as opposed to a friend 2 question, 
preceded it, a friend 1 priming score was calculated as the difference in reaction times between F2F1 
and F1F1 trials. A higher friend 1 priming score indicated stronger associations of emotions within 
friendship 1. In other words, recalling how one felt with a particular person made it easier to recall 
further emotional memories with that same person. In the same way, we calculated the friend 2 
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priming score as the difference in reaction times between F1F2 and F2F2 trials. We then averaged the 
friend 1 and friend 2 priming scores to create an overall friendship priming score that indicated the 
strength of association of an individual’s emotions by friendships in general. 
Emotional consistency and representation of emotions across relationships. To examine emotional 
consistency, we calculated an index of consistency across relationships as the within-subject 
correlation between each participant’s actual emotion ratings in the context of each of their two 
relationships. Higher correlation scores showed greater consistency in participants’ actual emotional 
experiences between different relationship contexts. For example, if participant A rated his happiness 
as a 5 when he was with his first friend and also with the second, this would show higher emotional 
consistency. On the other hand, participant B who rated her happiness as a 5 with her first friend, but 
as a 1 with her second friend is low on emotional consistency. Correlation scores were then Fisher r-
to-Z transformed before tests of significance were conducted. 
We predicted that individuals who were less emotionally consistent across relationships would have 
stronger associations of emotions within each relationship. In other words, we expected to find an 
inverse correlation between actual emotional consistency levels and the strength of associations or 
priming of emotions within relationships. In support of this prediction, we found a significant inverse 
correlation between emotional consistency scores and both the friend 1 (r(88) = −.31, p = .004) and 
friend 2 (r(88) = −.32, p = .003) priming scores. This was found with the overall friendship priming 
score as well (r(88) = −.39, p < .001). Thus, individuals who were less emotionally consistent across 
relationships had higher within-relationship priming scores, which indicated that less emotionally 
consistent individuals had stronger associations of emotions within each friendship. 
 
STUDY 2 
In our first study, we examined a single-culture sample and found support for Hypothesis 2. 
Individuals who were less consistent with their emotions between friendships were more likely to 
cognitively represent their emotions within each friendship separately. In Study 2, we expanded our 
analysis to examine cross-cultural differences in general levels of priming of emotions by 
relationships. While friendships had been the focus of Study 1, we sought to replicate our findings 
using other relationships. Participants were free to select any two friendships in Study 1, but in Study 
2, we opted to tighten the criteria for selection of relationships and predefined that participants would 
have to select one close friend and one of their parents to think about as they completed the task. In 
addition, while participants were instructed that the two friends selected in Study 1 should not know 
each other, it was still possible for some participants to have selected friends that they might have 
spent time with together. This possible overlap was better addressed in Study 2 by having participants 
select a parent and a friend instead. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from two college student samples and were undergraduates attending 
either the SMU in Singapore or East Carolina University (ECU) in the USA. Only participants born in 
America were included in the ECU sample and participants from SMU were screened for proficiency 
in English as a first language and being born in Asia. Following these screening criteria, we had 60 
male and 69 female participants from SMU and 49 male and 92 female participants from ECU. 
Participants from SMU (M = 21.43, SD = 1.67) were slightly older than those from ECU (M = 18.79, 
SD = 1.41), t(268) = 14.10, p < .001, d = 1.72. 
Materials and procedure 
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Participants completed the same Relationship-Emotions task as described in Study 1, but instead of 
two close friends, participants in Study 2 were instructed to choose a parent and a close friend. 
For the parent relationship, participants were asked to specify the name they use when they think of 
the parent (e.g. dad). Participants rated a total of 240 trials with half the trials showing the parent 
relationship as the target to be rated and the other half showing the friendship instead. 
Again, the order of presentation of the two relationships was randomised between each trial, such that 
different participants saw different orders (e.g. parent–parent–friend or friend–parent–friend). 
Results 
Data transformations and priming scores 
As with Study 1, outliers were identified as being plus or minus 2.5 standard deviations from the 
mean and were excluded from further analyses. Outliers constituted 2.0% of the data collected. For 
this study, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the differences in reaction times 
for the different relationship pair combinations between the cultural groups. However, for ease of 
interpretation, priming scores were also calculated to provide an indication of the strength of 
associations in the cognitive representation of emotions. The friend priming score was calculated as 
the difference in reaction time between parent–friend (PF) and friend–friend (FF) trials, as this 
indicated the extent to which participants were faster in answering a question about a friend when it 
was preceded by a friend question, as opposed to a parent question. A higher friend priming score 
indicated a stronger association of emotions within the friendship. In the same way, we calculated the 
parent priming score as the difference in reaction times between FP and PP trials. As in Study 1, we 
also calculated the relationship priming score as the average of the friendship and parent priming 
scores. 
Finally, we also calculated valence priming scores. The positive and negative priming scores were 
calculated as the difference in reaction times between negative–positive (np) and positive–positive 
(pp) trials, and the difference in reaction times between pn and nn trials, respectively. No cultural 
differences in valence priming were predicted and we indeed found no between-group differences. No 
differences were found in the positive priming scores for Singaporean students (M = 1.11, SD = .11) 
and American students (M = 1.11, SD = .11), t(268) = .12, p = .91, d = .01. 
And, no differences were found between Singaporean students (M = 1.03, SD = .10) and American 
students (M = 1.02, SD = .10, t(268) = 1.32, p = .19, d = .16, for their negative priming scores as well. 
Therefore, valence was not included in the further analyses. 
Replication of consistency and representation findings 
As in Study 1, an index of consistency across relationships was calculated as the within-subject 
correlation between each participant’s actual emotion ratings in their two relationships (parent and 
close friend) and correlation scores were then Fisher r-to-Z transformed. To test our hypothesis, we 
examined the correlation between the emotion consistency scores and parent and friend priming 
scores across all participants (i.e. across cultures). Significant inverse correlations were found for both 
the friend (r(270) = −.13, p = .031) and parent (r(270) = −.26, p < .001) priming scores. And this was 
also found with the overall relationship priming score as well (r(270) = −.27, p < .001). Thus, we 
found support for Hypothesis 2, and replicated our finding that individuals who were less emotionally 
consistent across relationships had higher within-relationship priming scores, which again indicated 
that less emotionally consistent individuals had stronger associations of emotions within each 
relationship. 
Culture and representation of emotions 
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A 2 (Culture) × 2 (Prime Relationship) × 2 (Target Relationship) mixed ANOVA on the log reaction 
times was conducted, with the relationship subject (i.e. parent or friend) of the prime and of the target 
serving as within-subject variables. We found a significant Prime Relationship by Target Relationship 
interaction, F(1, 268) = 533.61, p < .001, η2p = .67. Participants were significantly faster in responding 
when the target question matched (M = 1.41, SD = .36) the prime question in terms of the relationship 
it was referencing than when there was a mismatch (M = 1.55, SD = .41), t(269) = 20.41, p < .001, d = 
2.49. This interaction indicates that individuals do organise their emotions based on the dimension of 
relationships. 
In addition, as predicted, the Prime Relationship by Target Relationship by Culture three-way 
interaction was also significant, F(1, 268) = 5.29, p =.02, η2p = .019, which indicated that American 
and Singaporean students showed different levels of relationship priming effects. In support of 
Hypothesis 1, Singaporean students had significantly higher friend priming scores (M = 1.12, SD = 
.10) than American students (M = 1.10, SD = .10), t(268) = 2.08, p = .04, d = .25. Singaporean 
students also had slightly higher parent priming scores (M = 1.11, SD = .12) than American students 
(M = 1.09, SD = .09); however, this difference did not reach statistical significance, t(268) = 1.44, p = 
.16, d = .18. 
Culture and emotional consistency across relationships 
As predicted, Singaporeans (M = .43, SD = .42) had lower emotional consistency scores between 
relationships than Americans (M = .56, SD = .32), t(268) = 2.67, p = .008, d = .33. This finding 
supported Hypothesis 3A and provided a good replication of English and Chen’s (2007) findings 
about consistency across relationships, using a different measurement method.  
Cultural representation of emotion mediated by consistency between relationships 
In support of Hypothesis 3B, we found that the level of emotional consistency between relationships 
mediated the relationship between culture and cognitive representation of emotions. Following Baron 
and Kenny (1986), we first examined the relationship between culture and consistency between 
relationships using a regression model and found that culture was a significant predictor of 
consistency (β = .161, SE = .064, p =.008). Culture was also a significant predictor of representation 
of emotions (i.e. relationship priming score) (β = .139, SE =.004, p =.022). Next, we added our 
measure of consistency between relationships into the culture and representation regression model and 
found that consistency was a significant predictor of representation (β = −.025, SE = .003, p <.000), 
while culture was no longer significant (β = .099, SE = .003, p =.10). Consistency between 
relationships fully mediated the effects of culture on representation of emotions (Figure 2). A Sobel 
test provided further support for this full mediation (Z = 2.31, p = .020). In addition, we conducted the 
mediation analysis again using Preacher and Hayes’ bootstrapping method (Preacher & Hayes, 2004), 
which also revealed a significant mediation (bootstrapping path = −.0023, 95% confidence interval 
(CI) = [−.0046, −.0005]). 
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Figure 2. Mediation analysis for culture, consistency between relationships and cognitive representation of emotion 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We examined the role of social relationships in the cognitive representation of emotions across 
cultures. In two studies, we showed that lower cross-situational consistency in emotions was 
associated with stronger cognitive representational associations of emotions within relationships. In 
Study 2, we showed that in a culture where emotional consistency between relationships is more 
prevalent (USA), emotions within relationships were more weakly associated, compared to a culture 
where emotional flexibility (or inconsistency) is emphasised (Singapore). We also found that this 
difference in the cognitive representation of emotions was fully mediated by cultural differences in 
cross-situational consistency levels.  
Implications 
Our results bolster existing research that has shown that interdependent cultures tend to conceptualise 
emotions within the context of inter-personal relationships (Mesquita, 2001). Our studies are the first, 
to our knowledge, to examine the impact of cross-cultural differences in cognitive representations of 
emotions on individual recollections of emotions as part of one’s relations or as part of one self. 
While previous studies have examined cultural differences in attention and eye gaze patterns (e.g. 
Masuda et al., 2008, Nisbett, 2003), ours is the first to examine cultural differences in the cognitive 
association networks of emotions in the context of individual difference in how emotions are stored. 
Furthermore, using response latencies instead of self-report data, we obviate concerns about response 
styles and demand characteristics. 
Our results also extend existing research that demonstrates the robust stability of individual traits 
within relationships even as these traits varied across contexts. While English and Chen (2007) 
compared differences in the consistency of personality descriptors across relationships using a self-
report method, our study was instead focused on emotional experiences across relationships using a 
computerised task. Extending English and Chen’s research to emotions and using our response 
latency paradigm, we were able to conduct a direct test of their cross-cultural theory at the level of 
cognitive representational structures of emotions. While the focus of our research was on emotions, 
we think it would be worthwhile to examine if the same relationship between consistency and 
representation of semantic knowledge would also hold for other kinds of memories. 
Finally, the question of when such cross-cultural differences emerge developmentally is also 
unexplored to date. In both our sets of studies, we observe differences in between and within person 
stability cross-culturally among college students. Whether these cultural differences would emerge 
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among a sample of children remains an empirical question that may shed light on the development of 
cultural differences in the memory of emotions. 
Limitations and further questions 
This study was a first step in examining the impact on emotions of cross-cultural differences in the 
nature of emotions as contextual or belonging to the self at a cognitive level. In future research, it 
would be important to extend the paradigm we have examined and look at different relationships 
beyond that of close friends and parents. In Study 2, although the expected pattern of results was 
found for parent priming scores, in that Singaporeans had higher scores than Americans, this 
difference was not statistically significant. The question of the generalisability of our findings across 
different relationships remains to be examined in future studies. It is our expectation that our findings 
should replicate across different close relationships. 
These studies were also only conducted in a Singaporean and American school setting and it will be 
important to see how it could be replicated with other samples. In fact, some research suggests there 
could be important differences even among East Asian cultures in terms the amount and meaning of 
consistency across different contexts (Kashima et al., 2004). Further, future studies might want to 
include a specific measure of independence and interdependence to examine differences between 
samples and individuals on this factor. Our studies also only relied on a single research method 
design—that of a continuous semantic priming task. The task we used relied on participants being 
able to follow the instruction to provide ratings of their emotions with different people “as quickly 
and accurately as possible,” But it is possible that some might have found it difficult or unnatural to 
do this over the task’s successive trials. In addition, while we had instructed participants to select two 
friends who did not know each other in Study 1, it is possible that some might not have followed our 
instructions. Future studies should examine the use of other measures of cognitive representational 
structure to address some of these methodological concerns. 
Finally, building structurally on Suh’s (2002) findings that self-concept consistency was found to be 
less predictive in Korean culture of subjective well-being and social likeability, the question of the 
functionality of structuring one’s emotions in culture-specific ways also remains. It is worth 
examining if in order for interdependent individuals to be socially successful, it would be functionally 
important for them to have strong associations of their emotions within relationships. 
Self-report measures of relationship success or positive relationship outcomes could be used to 
provide a good first indicator of the social outcomes related to different representation schemes in 
different cultures, and beyond that, third party ratings of participants’ social success would also be 
important to examine. For example in the studies by Suh (2002), ratings from two informants (a 
family member and a friend) on how well the participant dealt with social situations and how likable 
the participant was in general were collected. 
In sum, we found that there were important cultural differences in the way emotions are cognitively 
represented. Specifically, we found stronger associations of emotions within close friendships in 
Singapore compared to America. 
Furthermore, our studies demonstrated a link between individuals’ emotional consistency levels and 
their cognitive representation of emotions across cultures. A significant inverse correlation was found 
between levels of emotional consistency across different relationships and tightness of representation 
of emotions around those relationships. People who were less emotionally consistent across 
relationships had stronger associations of their emotions within each relationship. In fact, emotional 
consistency across relationships was found to fully mediate the observed cultural differences in 
emotion representations.  
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